Module III·Article I·~1 min read
Moral Realism: Do Objective Values Exist?
Metaethics and Normativity
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The Central Question of Meta-ethics
Normative ethics answers: what should we do? Meta-ethics asks: what does it mean for “something to be right”? Are there moral facts independent of our beliefs? Or is morality a construct, a projection, an emotion?
Moral realism: Yes, there are objective moral facts. “Torturing a child for pleasure is wrong” is true regardless of whether anyone believes it. Plato (“Forms of the Good”), G. E. Moore (“non-natural moral properties”), Derek Parfit (“objective reasons”).
Moral anti-realism: There are no objective moral facts. Sub-variants:
- Subjectivism: moral statements express personal preferences
- Relativism: morality is relative to a culture or group
- Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson): “Murder is wrong” = “Murder! Boo!”
Why This Matters
If there is no moral realism—how can one criticize genocide, slavery, corruption from a standpoint of “objective evil”? If realism exists—how to explain moral progress and disagreement?
Question for reflection: Are you a moral realist or an anti-realist? How does your answer affect the way you conduct ethical discussions in your organization?
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