Globalization and Its Contradictions: Late 20th – Early 21st Century

“The End of History” and Its Refutation

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published the article “The End of History?” (and in 1992 — a book): liberal democracy had triumphed; there were no longer any alternative systems capable of competing with it; history as a struggle of ideologies was over. This was in tune with the optimism of the moment.

Since then, history has ironically refuted this thesis: Rwanda 1994, Bosnia 1995, September 11, 2001, Iraq 2003, the financial crisis of 2008, the rise of China, the Arab Spring and its collapse, the “flight from democracy” in the 2010s, the 2020 pandemic, the war in Ukraine. History continues.

Samuel Huntington (“The Clash of Civilizations,” 1993) proposed an alternative narrative: not competition of ideologies, but competition of civilizations — Western, Chinese, Islamic, Orthodox. The conflicts of the post-Cold War era will occur along civilizational fault lines. Also inaccurate — but provided another analytical framework.

Globalization: Integration and Its Costs

The 1990s–2000s were the peak of globalization: tariffs fell (WTO, 1995), production shifted to countries with cheap labor (China became the “factory of the world”), explosive growth in global trade and financial flows.

Winners: consumers in wealthy countries (cheap goods), the middle class in developing countries (hundreds of millions escaped poverty, especially in China), transnational corporations and the financial sector.

Losers: industrial workers in Western countries (deindustrialization), developing countries without competitive advantages (open markets onto which more competitive players entered).

Political consequence: 2016 — Brexit and Trump — two symptoms of the same phenomenon: an electoral revolt of “the losers from globalization” against the elites who benefited from it.

The Rise of China: The Most Important Fact of the 21st Century

From 1978 (Deng Xiaoping’s reforms) to 2023, China grew from agrarian poverty into the world’s second economy. This is unprecedented in scale and speed. Explanations: political stability, investment in infrastructure and education, integration into global manufacturing chains, strict industrial policy.

Question: Is an authoritarian political system compatible with long-term innovative leadership? China is already a leader in certain technological sectors (5G, solar energy, AI applications). The answer is not obvious.

Thucydides’ Dilemma (Graham Allison): In 12 out of 16 historical cases where a rising power challenged the dominant one, the result was war. Whether the China–U.S. confrontation will disprove or confirm this thesis — history will provide the answer.

What’s Next: Technology, Climate, Demographics

Three forces will shape global history over the next 50 years: (1) Technology — artificial intelligence, biotechnology, energy transition. (2) Climate crisis — massive redistribution of risks and resources. (3) Demographics — an aging West and Japan; young Africa; Russia with a declining population.

History is not a predetermined process. It is created by the decisions of people in specific situations. Knowledge of history is not a recipe, but the best insurance against repeating others’ mistakes.

Question for reflection: Globalization has created winners and losers. In your industry — who has benefited and who has lost from the latest wave of globalization? Which groups or regions might become winners in the next technological wave?