Module IX·Article III·~2 min read

Game Theory and Strategic Behavior

Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly

Turn this article into a podcast

Pick voices, format, length — AI generates the audio

Game theory and strategic behavior

Game theory is a mathematical apparatus for analyzing strategic interaction. When the outcome depends on the actions of several players, game theory helps to predict results and understand strategies.

Basic Concepts

  • Game: A situation of strategic interaction with defined players, strategies, and payoffs.
  • Players: Participants making decisions (firms, countries, individuals).
  • Strategies: The available courses of action.
  • Payoffs: The outcomes (profit, utility) for each combination of strategies.
  • Payoff matrix: A table showing payoffs for all combinations.

Prisoner's Dilemma

A classical example: two suspects, each can either keep silent or confess.

B keeps silentB confesses
A keeps silent(-1, -1)(-10, 0)
A confesses(0, -10)(-5, -5)

Analysis:

  • For each player, the dominant strategy is to confess.
  • Result: both confess (-5, -5).
  • But if both stayed silent, it would be better (-1, -1).
  • Individual rationality leads to a collectively worse outcome.

Nash Equilibrium

Definition: A combination of strategies such that no player wants to change their strategy if the others do not change theirs.

In the prisoner's dilemma: (confess, confess) is a Nash equilibrium.

Properties:

  • Stability—no one deviates unilaterally.
  • Not necessarily efficient.
  • There can be multiple Nash equilibria.

Oligopoly as a Prisoner's Dilemma

Pricing:

B: High PriceB: Low Price
A: High Price(100, 100)(20, 150)
A: Low Price(150, 20)(50, 50)

Analysis:

  • Mutually high prices are the best collective outcome (100, 100).
  • But for each player, the dominant strategy is to lower the price.
  • Nash equilibrium: (low, low) = (50, 50).
  • Price wars are the result of this logic.

Repeated Games

If the game is repeated:

  • Cooperation is possible based on the threat of punishment.
  • Tit-for-tat: start with cooperation, then copy the opponent’s actions.
  • Reputation and trust become important.

Conditions for cooperation:

  • Infinite horizon (or indefinite end).
  • A sufficiently low discount rate (future is valued).
  • Ability to observe and punish.

Cartels and Collusion

  • Cartel: explicit collusion to maintain high prices.
  • Stability problem: Each participant has an incentive to “cheat”—lower the price and take market share.
  • Prisoner's dilemma—a cartel is unstable.

What helps cartels:

  • Small number of participants (easier to coordinate).
  • Homogeneous product (easier monitoring).
  • Stable demand.
  • Punishment for deviation (OPEC).

Why cartels fall apart:

  • Temptation to cheat.
  • Changing conditions.
  • Entry of new players.
  • Antitrust prosecution.

For the Investor

Game theory helps to understand:

  • Probability of price wars.
  • Sustainability of price discipline.
  • Strategic decisions of companies.

Signs of a stable oligopoly:

  • History of price discipline.
  • Non-price competition.
  • Price setting transparency.
  • Market leader as a “price umbrella”.

Signs of instability:

  • Excess capacity.
  • New aggressive players.
  • Lowering of entry barriers.
  • Commodity-like nature of the product.

§ Act · what next