Roland Barthes and "Mythologies": Structures of the Everyday

Myth as a Secondary Semiotic System

Roland Barthes, in "Mythologies" (1957), reinterpreted the concept of myth: for him, myth is not an ancient story about gods, but an omnipresent mechanism for the naturalization of ideology. Myth transforms what is historically contingent, constructed, shaped by class interests—into the "natural," the "self-evident," "how it has always been."

Barthes employs Saussurean semiotics: sign = signifier + signified. Myth is built upon this schema as a secondary system: the primary sign (word, image, gesture) becomes the signifier for a new signified—the mythic meaning. The primary meaning does not disappear; it remains as an alibi for naturalization.

Barthes’s example: the cover of a French magazine featuring a Black soldier saluting (presumably) the French flag. Primary sign: a young African in uniform salutes. Mythic meaning: "France is a great empire, and all her sons, regardless of race, faithfully serve under her flag." The image "naturally" carries an ideological message, which is not explicitly stated—this is the work of myth.

Examples from "Mythologies"

Barthes analyzes a wide variety of objects from 1950s French mass culture as myths:

Steak and French fries: in the mythology of Frenchness, blood-rare steak is a symbol of strength, vitality, French spirit. Eating it bien cuit (well-done)—almost a betrayal.

Wrestling: professional wrestling is not deception (everyone knows the outcome is predetermined), but a ritual theatrical performance, enacting archetypal images of justice, villainy, and punishment. The crowd is not duped—they participate in the mystery.

The new Citroën: the car as a magical object descended from the heavens, an embodiment of technological supernatural. Advertising transforms the consumer product into an object of cult.

Greta Garbo's face: cinema creates icon-faces, where individuality disappears and an archetypal image remains.

Demythologization as Practice

Barthes does not call for the destruction of myths—this is impossible. He proposes the practice of mythology—critical analysis of the mechanism of myth. To see not only "what" is said, but "how" it is said—how form produces meaning, how what is constructed is naturalized.

This is practically important for: analyzing advertising (what values are "embedded" in the image?), political discourse (what assumptions are passed off as self-evident?), news narratives (whose point of view is "neutral" by default?), one’s own perception of culture.

Barthes’s methodology is applicable to any cultural text: to ask the question—what is "naturalized" here? What is passed off as self-evident? Whose interests does this "naturalness" serve? This is critical thinking in action.