Module XI·Article II·~3 min read
The Resource Curse
The Political Economy of Development
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The Resource Curse
Paradoxically, wealth in natural resources is often associated with poverty, authoritarianism, and conflict. This phenomenon—the “resource curse”—is one of the central puzzles in the political economy of development.
Empirical Observations
The relationship between resources and development is ambiguous:
Negative examples:
Nigeria — enormous oil revenues, mass poverty, corruption
Venezuela — largest oil reserves, economic collapse
Democratic Republic of the Congo — richest subsoil, poverty and wars
Post-Soviet resource countries — authoritarianism, weak diversification
Positive examples:
Norway — oil and the highest development level
Botswana — diamonds and one of the best growth figures in Africa
Chile — copper and steady growth
Australia, Canada — resources and prosperity
Conclusion: resources are neither a verdict nor a guarantee. Institutions and policy determine the outcome.
Economic Mechanisms
How do resources undermine development?
“Dutch Disease”:
- Inflow of petrodollars strengthens the national currency
- This makes exports of other goods more expensive
- Manufacturing and agriculture lose out
- The economy becomes single-sector
Volatility:
- Commodity prices are volatile
- Boom—growing expenditures, commitments
- Downturn—fiscal crisis, contraction
- Procyclical policy amplifies fluctuations
Suppression of human capital:
- Resource revenues reduce incentives to invest in education
- Easy money vs. accumulation of capabilities
- Young people go into the resource sector rather than productive industries
Political Mechanisms
Resources transform politics:
Resource Rent and Authoritarianism:
- The state is not dependent on citizens’ taxes
- No taxes—no representation
- Rent allows the purchase of loyalty and suppression of the opposition
- “Rentier state”
Competition for rent:
- Control over resources is the main prize
- Politics is a struggle for rent allocation, not development policy
- Corruption, clientelism, patronage
Conflicts:
- Resources finance both rebels and governments
- “Blood diamonds”, oil in South Sudan
- Secessionist movements in rich regions
Why Do Some Countries Avoid the Curse?
Successful resource-rich countries share common features:
Pre-existing institutions:
- Norway was a democracy with the rule of law before oil
- Botswana had traditional consultative institutions
- Institutions precede resources—a key condition
Geology:
- Point resources (oil, diamonds) are more dangerous than diffuse ones (farmland)
- Offshore oil is less dangerous—harder to seize
Governance rules:
- Sovereign funds (Norwegian Oil Fund)
- Spending rules (budget rules)
- Transparency and accountability
Diversification:
- Investment of resource revenues in human capital and infrastructure
- Creation of other industries in advance
International Dimension
The resource curse is not solely an internal problem:
Demand from developed countries. Oil and mineral consumers create the market.
Geopolitical interests support authoritarian regimes.
MNCs: Oil companies work with any regime
Transfer pricing—tax minimization
Corruption in obtaining concessions
Global Governance:
- EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative)—payment transparency
- Kimberley Process—diamond certification
- Sanctions against “blood” resources
Policy for Overcoming
How to fight the resource curse?
Institutional reforms:
- Democratization and accountability
- Independent regulators
- Anti-corruption measures
Fiscal rules:
- Sovereign wealth funds
- Spending rules smoothing the cycle
- Direct transfers to citizens (Alaska Permanent Fund)
Diversification:
- Industrial policy
- Investment in education and infrastructure
- Development of non-resource exports
Transparency:
- Publication of contracts
- Disclosure of revenues
- Civil society participation
The resource curse is not destiny. Given the right institutions and policies, resources can become a blessing. But this requires political will and favorable initial conditions.
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