Module XXI·Article I·~5 min read
Structure of PE Funds and the Economics of GP/LP
Private Equity
Turn this article into a podcast
Pick voices, format, length — AI generates the audio
Private Equity: The architecture of the Private Equity (PE) industry—a class of alternative investments that involves acquiring stakes in private companies or buying out public companies followed by delisting. The PE industry manages assets exceeding $8 trillion and is a key element in institutional investors' portfolios.
Structure of a PE Fund
A typical PE fund is organized as a Limited Partnership (LP) with two categories of participants:
| Participant | Role | Responsibility | Share of Profit |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Partner (GP) | Managing company making investment decisions | Unlimited | Carried Interest (usually 20%) |
| Limited Partners (LPs) | Investors providing capital | Limited by commitment size | 80% of profit after hurdle rate |
Lifecycle of a PE Fund
The standard lifetime of a fund is 10 years, with possible extension for 2-3 years:
| Phase | Period | Activity |
|---|---|---|
| Fundraising | 0-18 months | Attracting commitments from LPs, fund closing |
| Investment Period | Years 1-5 | Sourcing and acquiring portfolio companies, capital calls |
| Harvesting Period | Years 6-10+ | Value creation, preparation for exits, distributions |
GP Economics: Sources of Income
The General Partner earns compensation through several mechanisms:
1. Management Fee
Management fee is usually 2% per annum on committed capital during the investment period and on invested capital during the harvesting period:
- Fund $1 billion → Management fee $20 million/year
- Covers GP's operational expenses: salaries, rent, travel, due diligence
- Large LPs may negotiate reduction to 1.5% or fee breaks
2. Carried Interest
Carried interest is GP’s share in the fund's profit, usually 20%:
- Paid only after LPs have received their investments + hurdle rate
- Hurdle rate (preferred return) is typically 8% per annum
- After reaching the hurdle, catch-up applies: GP receives 100% of distributions until leveling to 20/80
Distribution Waterfall Formula:
European Waterfall (more conservative):
- Return of all invested capital to LPs
- Preferred return of 8% on invested capital
- GP catch-up to 20%
- Distribution 80/20 (LPs/GP)
American Waterfall (deal-by-deal):
- Return of invested capital per specific deal
- Preferred return per deal
- Carry is distributed after each successful exit
3. GP Commitment
GP invests its own funds in the fund—typically 1-5% of the fund size:
- Demonstrates alignment of interests with LPs
- Fund $1 billion → GP commitment $10-50 million
- Large institutional LPs require a minimum of 2-3%
Capital Calls and Distributions
LPs do not contribute their entire commitment at once—capital is requested as needed:
Capital Calls (Drawdowns)
- GP sends a notice 10-15 business days in advance
- LP must contribute the requested amount
- Failure results in default and loss of stake
- Typical profile: 25% in year 1, 25% in year 2, 20% in year 3, remainder in years 4-5
Distributions
- Return of capital and profits after successful exits
- Forms: cash, in-kind (shares of portfolio companies after IPO)
- Recallable distributions: GP may request return for new investments
J-Curve: Visualization of Cash Flows
J-Curve—a characteristic pattern of cumulative cash flows for a PE fund:
| Period | NAV / IRR Behavior | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Years 1-3 | Negative IRR, NAV below invested | Management fees, early-stage deals, write-downs |
| Years 4-6 | Enters positive zone | Operational improvements, first exits |
| Years 7-10 | Maximum distributions | Mature exits: sales to strategics, secondary buyouts, IPOs |
Graphical depiction of the J-Curve:
Cumulative Cash Flow
^
|
****
|
*****
|
***
|
**
|----------------**-------------------------> Time
| **
| **
| *
| *
| *
Historical Returns by Vintage Years
Vintage year—the year of the fund’s first closing. Returns vary significantly:
| Vintage Year | Median Net IRR | Top Quartile | Bottom Quartile |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 14.2% | 21.5% | 8.1% |
| 2012 | 15.8% | 24.3% | 9.7% |
| 2014 | 13.1% | 19.8% | 7.4% |
| 2016 | 14.5% | 22.1% | 8.9% |
| 2018 | 12.3% | 18.7% | 6.2% |
| 2020 | 15.1% | 23.4% | 9.3% |
Key Terms
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Clawback | GP’s obligation to return part of carry if the fund’s final return is below target |
| Hurdle Rate | Minimum return for LPs before carry payout begins (usually 8%) |
| Catch-up | Period when GP receives 100% of distributions to level up to target carry |
| Key Person Clause | Condition to suspend investment if key team members leave |
| No-fault Divorce | LPs’ right (usually 75%+) to terminate investment period early |
| LPAC | Limited Partner Advisory Committee—consultative body of major LPs |
Types of LP Investors
| Category | Examples | Share in Industry | Features |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pension Funds | CalPERS, Ontario Teachers | ~35% | Long-term horizon, focus on top-tier GPs |
| Sovereign Wealth Funds | GIC, ADIA, Mubadala | ~15% | Large tickets, co-investment appetite |
| Endowments | Yale, Harvard, Stanford | ~10% | Pioneers in alternatives, high PE allocation |
| Insurance Companies | MetLife, AXA | ~12% | Regulatory constraints, focus on credit |
| Family Offices | Walton, Koch | ~10% | Flexibility, direct investments, co-investments |
| Fund of Funds | HarbourVest, Partners Group | ~8% | Diversification, access for small investors |
Recommendations for LP Investor
- Plan liquidity: Capital calls are unpredictable, maintain reserve
- Vintage diversification: Invest annually to smooth the J-curve
- Manager selection: The difference between top quartile and median is huge (500+ bps)
- Read the LPA: Limited Partnership Agreement defines your rights
- Negotiation power: Large tickets provide leverage for better terms
§ Act · what next