Wittgenstein: From the "Tractatus" to the "Investigations"

Two Wittgensteins

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) is an exceptional case in the history of philosophy: he refuted himself and created an entirely different philosophy. The "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (1921) and the "Philosophical Investigations" (published posthumously, 1953) present two different, almost opposite views on language and philosophy. Reading both works together is a lesson in intellectual honesty and courage.

Wittgenstein was an engineer, served in the Austrian army during World War I, and worked as a gardener and elementary school teacher between his two philosophical periods. His life was as contradictory as his works.

The "Tractatus": The World as a Totality of Facts

Early Wittgenstein constructs a system: the world consists of facts (not things). Facts are atomic: they are combinations of objects in specific configurations. Propositions of language picture facts: each meaningful proposition is a logical image of a particular state of affairs in the world.

Consequence: only propositions about facts can be meaningful—that is, propositions of empirical science. Ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics are not false, but "meaningless" in the strict sense: they attempt to say what can only be shown.

The final proposition of the "Tractatus"—"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"—is not a prohibition, but a statement of the boundary of language. Everything most important (meaning of life, values, the mystical) is beyond this boundary, and no words can capture it.

Critique of the "Tractatus" and the Turn to the "Investigations"

In the 1930s, Wittgenstein began to see flaws in his early work. The main one: the idea that language has one function—to picture facts. Real language is much richer. "Pour me some water," "If Ivan came now…," "Oh, what a sunset!"—all these are propositions, but none of them "pictures a fact" in the Tractatus sense.

Late Wittgenstein introduces the concept of "language games" (Sprachspiele): language is not a single system, but a multitude of different practices, each with its own rules. A command is one game, a question another, a mathematical proof a third, a prayer a fourth. "Meaning is use."

"Family resemblance": concepts are united not by a single common feature, but by a network of overlapping similarities—like members of one family. "Game" has no single defining criterion: chess, football, word games, playing the stock market—they are connected not by one property, but by intertwining threads.

Philosophy as Therapy

Late Wittgenstein rethinks the task of philosophy: it is not theory-building, but therapy. Philosophical problems arise when words "go on holiday"—are used outside their usual language game. "What is time?"—the problem arises because the word "time" is torn from the context in which it normally works.

The philosopher's task is not to solve the problem, but to dissolve it, showing that it arose from linguistic confusion. "The fly must find a way out of the fly-bottle"—a philosophical problem should disappear, not be resolved.

Question for reflection: What "philosophical problems" in your organization or professional field might be linguistic confusion—different people use the same words in different ways?